THE FREE OFFER OF THE GOSPEL
By John Murray with a new foreword by R. Scott ClarkThe
foreword is ©2002, 2008 R. Scott Clark
Foreword This essay was written by John Murray
(1898-1975), professor of Systematic Theology in Westminster
Theological Seminary in Philadelphia and Ned B. Stonehouse
(1902-62), the distinguished professor of New Testament in
Westminster Theological Seminary in Philadelphia as a committee
report to the Fifteenth General Assembly of the Orthodox
Presbyterian Church (Minutes, 1948, Appendix, pp. 01-63).
The present version of the study was taken from the edition
published as a pamphlet in Phillipsburg, New Jersey. It was
republished in The Collected Writings of John Murray, 4
vol. ed. (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust, 1976-82), 4:113-132.
The preface to the pamphlet version said that the essay is "
re-printed here with slight corrections in the interests of the
gospel and Reformed theology." If this essay was needed fifty
years ago, it is much more necessary now. The historic Reformed
doctrine of the free offer of the Gospel is predicated upon a
particular view of theology, God and the Scriptures which is
under assault by rationalists on the Reformed right, if you
will, and the progressive, neo-evangelical, post-conservative on
the left.
On the Reformed right (the so-called hyper-Calvinists), there
is a strain of rationalism which one finds expressed by thinkers
such as Herman Hoeksema, Gordon Clark and John Gerstner, which
rejects the doctrine of the Free Offer of the Gospel as
implicitly Arminian. They are rationalists inasmuch as they
reject this doctrine fundamentally because they find it
unreasonable. Reformed theology has been accused for its entire
history of beginning with an a priori doctrine of divine
sovereignty from which it is said to have deduced its doctrines
of double predestination and the federalism. This charge has
been shown by modern historical theology (e.g., the massive
research of Richard Muller summarized in C. R. Trueman and R. S.
Clark, ed., Protestant Scholasticism: Essays in Reassessment
[Carlisle, UK: Paternoster, 1999]) to be patently false when
applied to the mainstream of historic, confessional Reformed
theology. There have been exceptions, and on this question, G.
Clark, Hoeksema and Gerstner lived up to the caricature of
Reformed theology.
On the left, Progressive, post-conservative neo-evangelical,
self-described Open-theists such as Clark Pinnock and Gregory
Boyd have not only rejected classic Arminianism, whether that of
Arminius himself or that of the Wesleyan varieties, but also the
catholic doctrines of foreknowledge and omnipotence. Like the
hyper-Calvinists they too are guilty of a form of rationalism.
Claiming to reject the catholic doctrine of God as too "Greek"
(i.e., too Platonist?) they claim to have constructed a doctrine
of God which is more biblical than the historic Christian
doctrine. Their claim is false. Upon examination it becomes
abundantly clear that they too want a doctrine of God which will
make sense to the Postmodern (postfoundationalist) mind and so
they have turned Scripture on its head. According to them, God
actually repents, halters and changes. Omniscience is redefined
to mean that God knows only what can be known. The future, they
argue, cannot be known, therefore God does not know it. He
cannot control the future, for that would jeopardize the
autonomy and dignity of persons, therefore, they surmise, God
must be the most excellent chess player, reacting brilliantly to
our every initiative. This is nothing if not rationalism.
One hopes that if the confessional Reformed world will again
take up heartily the doctrine of the free offer of the gospel,
we might provide an exegetically solid and theologically sound
response to the heresy of Open Theism and the rationalism of the
hyper-Calvinists.
One reason why this most important essay has been lost to the
Reformed and evangelical world is because we have forgotten or
corrupted three great assumptions on which it was premised: the
nature of Christian theology, the catholic (i.e., creedal) and
Reformed (i.e., confessional) doctrine of God and the Reformed
doctrine of accommodation.
Murray and the 1948 General Assembly of the OPC understood
the historic Reformed distinction between theology as God knows
it, theology as he reveals it to us and theology as we do it. In
our time these distinctions have been lost and replaced with
subjectivism of various kinds. Classic Reformed theology (e.g.,
the 17th century Reformed academic theologians)
called theology as God does it, archetypal or
theologia archetypa. Theology exists, first of all, in the
mind of God. The triune God has a self-understanding and
understanding and interpretation of the world is the basis for
his revelation to his creatures.
Given the necessary chasm between God and the creature, as
taught by Calvin and defended so ably and so long by Cornelius
van Til, God must accommodate himself to his creatures. This
accommodated revelation of God's mind and will is ectyptal
theology (theologia ectypa). It is based upon God's
self-understanding, but not identical with it. Ectypal theology,
as the adjective suggests, is a reflection of the archetypal
theology. It is true, but it is accommodated to human creature.
It would appear that neither the Hyper-Calvinists nor the
Open-Theists have understood or accounted for this distinction.
All revelation is necessarily an accommodation. It is not as if,
sometimes we have direct, unmediated access to God and at other
times we do not. " Not that any man has seen the Father, except
the One who is from God; He has seen the Father" (John 6:46).
Unaccommodated revelation would necessarily be fatal to its
objects, since no human may see the unmediated face of God and
live (Exodus 34:20). What we are doing now, getting to grips
with God's self-disclosure primarily in Scripture, was described
in classic Reformed theology as pilgrim theology (theologia
viatorum), a sub-species of ectypal theology. In order to do
pilgrim theology properly, one must account for the accommodated
nature of divine revelation (ectypal theology).
Sometimes this accommodation is intensified by the use of
anthropomorphism (the application of human behavior to God) or
anthropopathism (the application of human emotion to God). Thus,
in Scripture, God is sometimes said to have eyes (Zech 2:8) or
to travel (Gen 20:3) or to repent (Gen 6:6-7). This sort of
language has always been interpreted by the catholic Church to
be metaphoric or symbolic not because of pagan a priori
notions of God, but because of clear Biblical propositions about
God which have been used to interpret the narratives in which
God reveals himself anthropomorphically. For example, Scripture
teaches clearly that God does not change (Mal 3:6) or repent
(Numbers 23:19). Therefore, on the analogy of Scripture and by
the analogy of the faith, such clear propositions must interpret
what are obviously more difficult passages which seem to ascribe
human qualities to God. To do otherwise is to reduce the God of
Scripture to an incompetent and worse to an idol.
The Reformed doctrine of the free offer of the Gospel is
based squarely on the interpretation of Scripture expressed in
the Apostles' Creed, when it says, "I believe in God the Father
Almighty
." The God of the Bible is the sovereign Creator of all
and Redeemer of all his elect. He is not "cooperator" with an
autonomous creation, but its sovereign, free, independent maker.
He spoke and by the power of his Word, all that is, has occurred
(John 1:3). This is also the doctrine of the Nicene Creed and
the Athanasian Creed where God is "uncreate",
"incomprehensible", "eternal" and "almighty."
Murray understands rightly that this sovereign God is also
free to reveal himself as desiring certain things which he also
reveals that he has not willed decretively. Here Murray invoked
an ancient distinction in Christian theology, between God's will
considered decretively and preceptively. That is, it is not that
God has two wills, but that, given the archetypal/ectypal
distinction, there is a distinction to be made in our
understanding of his will.
Before God's will is revealed in Scripture or actuated in the
history of salvation or providence, no human knows what God has
decreed from all eternity. Therefore it is cupidity to try to
guess what God's secret will before it is realized in history.
Nevertheless, God reveals that he has decreed whatsoever comes
to pass, and he even sometimes reveals exactly what he has
decreed before it happens (e.g., Deut 28 and 30). These
declarations of what will transpire do not mean that God is
unable to also make moral demands upon his creature, even though
the future is predestined (e.g., Deut 30:19), even when the
moral demands seem to contradict what we know from Scripture to
be his decree. It is because of this tension between God as he
is in himself (in se) and as he is toward us (erga nos)
that theology distinguishes between God's decretive and
preceptive or moral will.
This distinction between God revealed (Deus revelatus)
and God hidden (Deus absconditus) has a long history in
Christian theology. It was one of the foundational doctrines of
the Reformation. Luther's entire argument with Erasmus in his
Bondage of the Will (1525) was premised upon this
distinction. Calvin likewise relied on it throughout the
Institutes of the Christian Religion (1559).
There is more that could be said about the immediate
background of this essay, but this preface threatens to overtake
the essay itself. For more see R. Scott Clark, "Janus, the
Well-Meant Offer of the Gospel and Westminster Theology, in
David VanDrunen, ed., The Pattern of Sound Words: A
Festschrift for Robert B. Strimple (Phillipsburg: P&R
Publishing, 2004).
This preface is only an attempt to explain some of the
theological categories which Murray used but did not explain in
his report. With all this, however, it should not be forgotten
that the purpose of a right understanding of the free offer of
the Gospel is that we might actually go out, stand in our
pulpits and offer Christ the only Savior to needy sinners,
trusting in sovereign grace to do its work. It is the preached
Gospel that God the Holy Spirit has willed to use to bring his
elect to faith (Romans 10:14; Heidelberg Catechism Q. 65).
May our Triune God use this essay to rekindle in our hearts
compassion for the lost, and a desire to see all of those for
whom Jesus died come to saving faith, by grace alone, through
faith alone in Christ alone.
Escondido, California
11 July 2000, rev. 2002, 2004, 2008.
***
THE FREE OFFER OF THE GOSPELBy
John Murray
Introduction
It would appear that the real point in dispute in connection
with the free offer of the gospel is whether it can properly be
said that God desires the salvation of all men. The
Committee elected by the Twelfth General Assembly in its report
to the Thirteenth General Assembly said "God not only delights
in the penitent but is also moved by the riches of his goodness
and mercy to desire the repentance and salvation of the
impenitent and reprobate" (Minutes, p. 67). It should
have been apparent that the aforesaid Committee, in predicating
such "desire" of God, was not dealing with the decretive will of
God; it was dealing with the free offer of the gospel to all
without distinction and that surely respects, not the decretive
or secret will of God, but the revealed will. There is no ground
for the supposition that the expression was intended to refer to
God's decretive will.
It must be admitted that if the expression were intended to
apply to the decretive will of God then there would be, at
least, implicit contradiction. For to say that God desires the
salvation of the reprobate and also that God wills the damnation
of the reprobate and apply the former to the same thing as the
latter, namely, the decretive will, would be contradiction; it
would amount to averring of the same thing, viewed from the same
aspect, God wills and God does not will. The question then is:
what is implicit in, or lies back of; the full and free offer of
the gospel to all without distinction? The word "desire" has
come to be used in the debate, not because it is necessarily
the most accurate or felicitous word but because it serves
to set forth quite sharply a certain implication of the full and
free offer of the gospel to all. This implication is that in the
free offer there is expressed not simply the bare preceptive
will of God but the disposition of lovingkindness on the part of
God pointing to the salvation to be gained through compliance
with the overtures of gospel grace. In other words, the gospel
is not simply an offer or invitation but also implies that God
delights that those to whom the offer comes would enjoy what is
offered in all its fullness. And the word "desire" has been used
in order to express the thought epitomized in Ezekiel 33:11,
which is to the effect that God has pleasure that the wicked
turn from his evil way and live. It might as well have been
said, "It pleases God that the wicked repent and be saved."
Again, the expression "God desires,'' in the formula that
crystallizes the crux of the question, is intended to notify not
at all the "seeming" attitude of God but a real attitude, a real
disposition of lovingkindness inherent in the free offer to all,
in other words, a pleasure or delight in God, contemplating the
blessed result to be achieved by compliance with the overture
proffered and the invitation given.
Still further, it is necessary to point out that such
"desire" on the part of God for the salvation of all must never
be conceived of as desire to such an end apart from the means to
that end. It is not desire of their salvation irrespective of
repentance and faith. Such would be inconceivable. For it would
mean, as Calvin says, "to renounce the difference between good
and evil." If it is proper to say that God desires the salvation
of the reprobate, then he desires such by their repentance. And
so it amounts to the same thing to say "God desires their
salvation" as to say "He desires their repentance." This is the
same as saying that he desires them to comply with the
indispensable conditions of salvation. It would be impossible to
say the one without implying the other.
Scriptural Basis
The Committee would now respectfully
submit some exegetical material bearing upon this question and
with a view to the resolution of it.
Matthew 5:44-48. This passage does not indeed deal
with the overtures of grace in the gospel. But it does tell us
something regarding God's benevolence that has bearing upon all
manifestations of divine grace. The particular aspect of God's
grace reflected upon here is the common gifts of providence, the
making of the sun to rise upon evil and good and the sending of
rain upon just and unjust. There can be no question but all
without distinction reprobate as well as elect, are the
beneficiaries of this favour, and it is that fact that is
distinctly stated in verse 45.
The significant feature of this text is that this bestowal of
favour by God on all alike is adduced as the reason why
the disciples are to love their enemies and do them good. There
is, of course, a question as to the proper text of verse 44. If
we follow the Aleph-B text and omit the clauses, "bless them who
curse you, do good to them who hate you" as well as the verb
"despitefully use," the sense is not affected. And besides,
these clauses, though they may not belong to the genuine text of
Matthew, appear in Luke 6:27,28 in practically the same form.
Hence the teaching of our Lord undoubtedly was that the
disciples were to love their enemies, do good to those who hated
them, bless those who cursed them, and pray for those who
despitefully used them and persecuted them. And the reason
provided is that God himself bestows his favours upon his
enemies. The particular reason mentioned why the disciples are
to be guided and animated by the divine example is that they,
the disciples, are sons of the Father. The obligation and urge
to the love of their enemies and the bestowal of good upon them
are here grounded in the filial relation that they sustain to
God. Since they are sons of God they must be like their heavenly
Father. There can be no doubt but that the main point is the
necessity of imitating the divine example and this necessity is
peculiarly enforced by the consideration of the filial relation
they sustain to God as their heavenly Father.
It is just here, however, that it becomes necessary to note
the implications of the similarity established and enforced as
the reason for such attitude and conduct with reference to their
enemies. The disciples are to love their enemies in order that
they may be the sons of their Father; they must imitate their
Father. Clearly implied is the thought that God, the Father,
loves his enemies and that it is because he loves his enemies
that he makes his sun rise upon them and sends them rain. This
is just saying that the kindness bestowed in sunshine and rain
is the expression of divine love, that back of the bestowal
there is an attitude on the part of God, called love, which
constrains him to bestow these tokens of his lovingkindness.
This informs us that the gifts bestowed by God are not simply
gifts which have the effect of good and blessing to those who
are the recipients but that they are also a manifestation or
expression of lovingkindness and goodness in the heart or will
of God with reference to those who are the recipients. The
enjoyment on the part of the recipients has its ground as well
as its source in this lovingkindness of which the gifts enjoyed
are the expression. In other words, these are gifts and are
enjoyed because there is in a true and high sense benevolence in
the heart of God.
These conclusions are reinforced by verse 48. There can be no
question regarding the immediate relevance of verse 48 to the
exhortation of verses 44-47, even though it may have a more
comprehensive reference. And verse 48 means that what has been
adduced by way of divine example in the preceding verses is set
forth as epitomizing the divine perfection and as providing the
great exemplar by which the believer's attitude and conduct are
to be governed and the goal to which thought and life are to be
oriented. The love and beneficence of God to the evil and unjust
epitomize the norm of human perfection. It is obvious that this
love and beneficence on the part of God are regarded by our Lord
himself as not something incidental in God but as that which
constitutes an element in the sum of divine perfection. This is
made very specific in the parallel passage in Luke 6 :35,36
where we read, "And ye shall be sons of the Most High, because
he is kind towards the unthankful and evil. Ye shall be
merciful, as your Father is merciful." This word translated
"merciful" is redolent of the pity and compassion in the heart
of God that overflow in the bestowments of kindness.
The sum of this study of these passages in Matthew and Luke
is simply this, that presupposed in God's gifts bestowed upon
the ungodly there is in God a disposition of love, kindness,
mercifulness, and that the actual gifts and the blessing
accruing therefrom for the ungodly must not be abstracted from
the lovingkindness of which they are the expression. And, of
course, we must not think of this lovingkindness as conditioned
upon a penitent attitude in the recipients. The lovingkindness
rather is exercised towards them in their ungodly state
and is expressed in the favours they enjoy. What bearing
this may have upon the grace of God manifested in the free offer
of the gospel to all without distinction remains to be seen. But
we are hereby given a disclosure of goodness in the heart of God
and of the relation there is between gifts bestowed and the
lovingkindness from which they flow. And there is indicated to
us something respecting God's love or benevolence that we might
not or could not entertain if we concentrated our thought simply
on the divine decree of reprobation. Furthermore we must
remember that there are many gifts enjoyed by the ungodly who
are within the pale of the gospel administration which are not
enjoyed by those outside, and we shall have to conclude that in
respect of these specific favours, enjoyed by such ungodly
persons in distinction from others, the same principle of divine
benevolence and lovingkindness must obtain, a lovingkindness,
too, which must correspond to the character of the specific
gifts enjoyed.
Acts 14:17. This text does not express as much as
those considered already. But it does witness to the same truth
that God gave testimony to his own perfection when he did good
to those whom he left to walk in their own ways. God did them
good, he sent them rain from heaven and fruitful seasons,
filling their hearts with food and gladness. We must infer on
the basis of what we found already, that behind this doing of
good and bestowal of blessing, as well as behind the gladness of
heart which followed, there was the divine goodness and
lovingkindness.
Deuteronomy 5:29 (26 in Hebrew); 32:29; Psalm 81:13ff.
(81:14ff. in Hebrew); I6aiah 48:18. The purpose of adducing
these texts is to note the optative force of that which is
expressed. There can be no reasonable question as to the
optative force of Deuteronomy 5 :29(26). It is introduced by the
idiom mi yitten which literally means "who will give?"
but is really a strong optative expression meaning "Oh that
there were!" Consequently the text reads, "Oh that there were
such a heart in them, that they would fear me, and keep all my
commandments always, that it might be well with them, and with
their children for ever!" It is the Lord who is speaking and we
shall have to conclude that here we have the expression of
earnest desire or wish or will that the people of Israel were of
a heart to fear him and keep all his commandments always. It is
apparent from the book of Deuteronomy itself (cf. 31:24-29) and
from the whole history of Israel that they did not have a heart
to fear God and to keep all his commandments always. Since they
did not fulfil that which was optatively expressed in 5:29 (26),
we must conclude that God had not decreed that they should have
such a heart. If God had decreed it, it would have been so. Here
therefore we have an instance of desire on the part of God for
the fulfilment of that which he had not decreed. in other words,
a will on the part of God to that which he had not decretively
willed.
In Deuteronomy 32:29 the construction is somewhat different.
In our English versions it is translated, "Oh that they were
wise, that they understood this, that they would consider their
latter end." This rendering is distinctly optative and has the
same effect as Deuteronomy 5:29 (26), considered above. It must
be admitted that this is - a perfectly legitimate rendering and
interpretation. The conjunction lu with which the verse
begins has undoubtedly this optative force. It has such force
unquestionably in Genesis 17:18; Numb. 14:2, 20:3; 22:29; Joshua
7:7; Isaiah 63:19, and possibly, if not probably, in Genesis
23:13, 30:34. When lu has this optative force it means
"Oh that" or "if only" and expresses strong desire. In view of
what we found in Deut. 5:26 there is no reason why the optative
force of lu should not be adopted here. We may not
however, insist that lu must have optative force here
because lu is also used with conditional force, as in
Judges 8:19; 13:23; II Samuel 18:12 and elsewhere. If lu
is understood conditionally, Deut. 32:29 would be rendered as
follows: "If they were wise they would understand this, they
would consider their fatter end." This however, is not the most
natural rendering. The optative interpretation is smoother and
more meaningful in the context. If this more natural
construction is followed it shows the same thing as we found in
Deut. 5:26 that earnest desire is expressed for what is contrary
to fact (cf.. verse 28)
In Psalm 81:14 it may readily be detected that the
conditional force of the conjunction lu cannot
reasonably be adopted. The thought is rather distinctly
optative, "Oh that my people were hearkening unto me, that
Israel would walk in my ways."
Isaiah 48:18 could readily be rendered conditionally thus:
"If thou hadst hearkened to my commandments, thy peace had been
as a river and thy righteousness as the waves of the sea." It
can also be rendered optatively as in our English versions.
It should be noted that even when the conjunction lu
is given very distinct conditional force, the optative idea is
sometimes rather noticeably in the background. This would very
likely be the case in Isaiah 48:18 even if the optative
rendering gives way to the conditional. The desirableness of
that which is expressed in the condition and its corresponding
consequence cannot be suppressed. This can be expressed in our
English idiom very well when we render, "If only thou hadst
hearkened to my commandments, then had thy peace been as a
river" etc. Both the conditional and optative appear here, and
there is much to be said in favour of the conclusion that
whether we render Isa. 48:18 optatively or conditionally the
optative notion still persists, in the former case, of course,
directly and in the latter case indirectly.
Should we make full allowance for doubt as to the exact force
of the construction in the case of Deut. 32:29 and Isa. 48:18,
there can be no room for question but that the Lord represents
himself in some of these passages as earnestly desiring the
fulfilment of something which he had not in the exercise of his
sovereign will actually decreed to come to pass. This bears very
directly upon the point at issue.
Matthew 23 :37; Luke 13:34. In this passage there
should be no dispute that the will of Christ in the direction of
a certain benign result is set in contrast with the will of
those who are contemplated as the subjects of such blessing.
These two stand in opposition to each otherI have willed (or
wished), ye have not willed (or wished).
Not only so. The will of Christ to a certain end is opposed
to that which actually occurred. Jesus says he often wished the
occurrence of something which did not come to pass and therefore
willed (or wished) the occurrence of that which God had not
secretly or decretively willed.
That which Jesus willed is stated to be the gathering
together of the children of Jerusalem, as a hen gathers together
her chickens under her wings. This surely means the gathering
together of the people of Jerusalem under his saving and
protecting grace. So we have the most emphatic declaration on
the part of Christ of his having yearned for the conversion and
salvation of the people of Jerusalem
It might be said that Jesus is here giving expression simply
to his human desire and that this would not indicate, therefore,
the desire or will of God. In other words, it might be said that
we are not justified in transferring this expression of his
human desire to the divine desire or will, either in
respect of Jesus' own divine consciousness or the divine
consciousness of the other persons of the Godhead.
Christ was indeed truly human and his human mind and will
operated within the limitations inseparable from human nature.
His human nature was not omniscient and could not in the nature
of the case be cognisant of the whole decretive will of God. In
his human nature he wrought within limits that could not apply
to the specifically divine knowledge, desire and will. Hence it
might be argued that on this occasion he gave expression to the
yearnings of his truly human will and therefore to a will that
could not be aware of the whole secret purpose of God.
Furthermore, it might be said that Jesus was speaking of what he
willed in the past before he was aware, in his human
consciousness, of the judgment that was to befall Jerusalem,
stated in verses 38, 39. A great deal more might be said along
this line that would lend plausibility to such an
interpretation.
We are not able to regard such an interpretation of our
Lord's statement as tenable. It is true our Lord was human. It
is true he spoke as human. And it is true he spoke these words
or gave utterance to this lament through the medium of his human
nature. The will he spoke of on this occasion was certainly one
that engaged the total exercise of his human desire and will.
But there is much more that needs to be considered if we are
properly to assess the significance of this incident and of
Jesus' utterance. Jesus is speaking here in his capacity as the
Messiah and Saviour. He is speaking therefore as the God-man. He
is speaking of the will on his part as the Messiah and Saviour
to embrace the people of Jerusalem in the arms of his saving
grace and covenant love. The majesty that belongs to his person
in this unique capacity shines through the whole episode and it
is quite improper to abstract the divine aspect of his person
from the capacity in which he gives utterance to this will and
from the prerogative in virtue of which he could give expression
to the utterance. What needs to be appreciated is that the
embrace of which Jesus here speaks is that which he exercises in
that unique office and prerogative that belong to him as the
God-man Messiah and Saviour. In view of the transcendent, divine
function which he says he wished to perform, it would be
illegitimate for us to say that here we have simply an example
of his human desire or will. It is surely, therefore, a
revelation to us of the divine will as well as of the human. Our
Lord in the exercise of his most specific and unique function as
the God-man gives expression to a yearning will on his part that
responsiveness on the part of the people of Jerusalem would have
provided the necessary condition for the bestowal of his saving
and protecting love, a responsiveness, nevertheless, which it
was not the decretive will of God to create in their hearts.
In this connection we must not fail to keep in mind the
principle borne out by Jesus' own repeated declarations,
especially as recorded in the Gospel of John, namely, the
perfect harmony and coalescence of will on the part of the
Father and of the Son (cf. John 12:49,50; 14:10, 24; 17:8). To
aver that Jesus in the expressed will of Matt. 23:37 is not
disclosing the divine will but simply his own human will
would tend towards very grave prejudice to this principle. And,
viewing the matter from the standpoint of revelation, how would
it affect our conception of Jesus as the supreme revelation of
the Father if in this case we were not to regard his words as a
transcript of the Father's will as well as of his own? We can
readily see the difficulties that face us if we do not grant the
truly revelatory significance of our Lords statement.
In this lament over Jerusalem, furthermore, there is surely
disclosed to us something of the will of our Lord as the Son of
God and divine Son of man that lies back of, and is expressed
in, such an invitation as Matthew 11:28. Here we have declared,
if we may use the thought of Matthew 23:37, his will to embrace
the labouring and heavy laden in the arms of his saving and
loving protection. And it is an invitation to all such to take
advantage of that will of his. The fulness and freeness of the
invitation need not now be argued. Its character as such is
patent. It is important, however, to note that the basis and
background of this invitation are supplied by the uniqueness of
the relation that he sustains to the Father as the Son, the
transcendent commission that is given to him as the Son, and the
sovereignty, coordinate with that of the Father, which he
exercises because of that unique relationship and in that unique
capacity. We should not fail to perceive the
interrelations of these two passages (Matt. 23:37; 11:28) and to
recognize that the former is redolent of his divine prerogative
and revelatory of his divine will. Verses 38 and 39 confirm the
high prerogative in terms of which he is speaking, for there he
pronounces the divine judgment. And in this connection we cannot
forget John 5:26,27, "For as the Father hath life in himself,
even so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself. And he
hath given to him authority to execute judgment, because
he is the Son of man."
Ezekiel 18:23,32; 33:11. It does not appear to us in
the least justifiable to limit the reference of these passages
to any one class of wicked persons. Suffice it now to mention
one or two considerations in support of this conclusion. In
Ezekiel 33:4-9 the wicked who actually die in their iniquity are
contemplated. It is without warrant to exclude such wicked
persons from the scope of the wicked spoken of in verse 11.
While it is true that a new paragraph may be regarded as
introduced at verse 10, yet the new thought of verse 10 is
simply the despairing argument or objection on the part of the
house of Israel and does not have the effect of qualifying the
denotation or connotation of the wicked mentioned in verse 11, a
denotation and a connotation determined by the preceding verses.
Again, the emphatic negative of the first part of verse 11 -"I
have no pleasure in the death of the wicked"admits of no
limitation or qualification; it applies to the wicked who
actually die in their iniquity. Why then should there be the
least disposition to limit those spoken of in the text to any
class of wicked persons?
In Ezekiel 18:23 the construction is not without
significance. This verse is introduced by the interrogative and
then we have the emphatic construction of duplication well known
in Hebrew. It might be rendered, "Taking pleasure in, do I take
pleasure in ?" The question implies, of course, an emphatic
negative. It should also be noted that the verb in this case
takes a direct object, namely, "the death of the wicked"
(moth rasha without any article). In this case we do not
have the preposition be as in Ezekiel 33:11.1
It should be noted that the verb chaphez with such a
construction can very properly be rendered by our English word,
"desire," as frequently elsewhere in the Old Testament.
Consequently this verse may well be rendered, "Do I at all
desire the death of the wicked?" The force of this is obiously
the emphatic negative, "I do not by any means desire the death
of the wicked," or to be very literal, "I do not by any means
desire the death of a wicked person.
The interrogative construction is continued in the latter
part of the verse. Here, however, it is negative in form,
implying an affirmative answer to the question just as in the
former part the affirmative form implied a negative answer. It
reads, "Is it not rather in his turning from his way (the
Massoretes read "his ways") and live?" The clear import is an
emphatic asseveration to the effect that the Lord Jehovah
delights rather in the turning of the wicked from his evil way
that he may live. The adversative form of the sentence may well
be rendered thus: "Do I at all desire the death of the wicked,
saith the Lord Jehovah, and not rather that he turn from his way
and live.
The sum of the matter may be stated in the following
propositions. It is absolutely and universally true that God
does not delight in or desire the death of a wicked person. It
is likewise absolutely and universally true that he delights in
the repentance and life of that wicked person. It would surely
be quite unwarranted to apply the latter proposition less
universally or more restrictively than the former. The
adversative construction and the emphatic form by which the
protestation is introduced are surely not compatible with any
other conclusion. And if we carry over the perfectly proper
rendering of the first clause, the thought can be expressed
thus, "God does not desire the death of the wicked but rather
their repentance and life."
In Ezekiel 33:11 the construction is somewhat different. The
statement is introduced by the oath, "As I live saith the Lord
Jehovah." Then we have the construction with the Hebrew
im, which has the force of an emphatic negative and must
be rendered, "I have no delight (or pleasure)
in the death of
the wicked" (bemoth harasha; in this case the article is
used). It should be noted that the preposition be is used
in this case, as also in the second part of 18:23 as observed
below.2 This is a very
frequent construction in Hebrew with reference to delight in
persons or things. Interesting examples are II Sam. 24:3; Esther
6:6,7,9,11; Ps. 147:10; Prov. 18:2, Isa. 65:12; Mal 2:17. On
certain occasions the Hebrew word could well be translated
"desire" in English and the word that follows the preposition
taken as the direct object (e.g. II Sam. 24:3).
It has been argued that the preposition be in Ezekiel
33:11b has the force of "when" so that the verse would run, "As
I live, saith the Lord Jehovah, I have no pleasure in the death
of the wicked but when the wicked turns from his way and lives."
And so it has been claimed that all that is said in this verse
is that Gor3 is pleased when the wicked turns and cannot be made
to support the proposition that God is pleased that the wicked
should repent whether they repent or not. On this view it
would be maintained that this verse says nothing more than that
God is pleased when a wicked man repents but says nothing
respecting the pleasure of God in reference to the repentance of
those who do not actually repent.
In dealing with this question a few things need be said. (1)
A study of the instances where this construction of the verb
chaphez with the preposition be occurs would not suggest
this interpretation of the force of the preposition be. The
usage rather indicates that the preposition points to that upon
which pleasure is placed, that to which desire gravitates, that
in which delight is taken. That object of pleasure, desire,
delight may he conceived of as existing, or as something not
actually existent, or as something desirable, that is to say,
desired to be. When the object is contemplated as desirable but
not actually realized, the thought of chaphez does not at
all appear to be simply that delight or pleasure will be derived
from the object when it is realized or possessed. That thought
is, of course, implied. But there is much more. There is the
delight or pleasure or desire that it should come to be, even if
the actual occurrence should never take place. Consequently it
appears that the notion that Ezekiel 33:1lb simply says that God
is pleased when a wicked man repents robs the concept expressed
by chaphez be of some of its most characteristic and
necessary meaning. It is not in any way denied that this kind of
delight is embraced in the expression. But to limit the concept
to this notion is without warrant and is not borne out by the
usage.
(2) The adversative construction of the verse would not by
any means suggest the interpretation that verse 11b says simply
that God is pleased when a man repents. In the same clause it is
denied that God has pleasure in the death of the wicked. In
accordance with 18:23 this means that it is true absolutely and
universally that God does not delight in the death of the
wicked. This does not mean simply that God does not delight in
the death of the wicked when he dies. The denial is much more
embracive. In like manner, it would be unnatural for us to
suppose that the affirmation of that in which God does take
delight is simply the turning of the wicked from his way when it
occurs. This is just saying that it is natural to give to the
preposition be in the second clause the same force as it has in
the first. Rendered literally then the two clauses would read,
"I do not have pleasure in the death of the wicked but rather in
his turning from his way and that he live." Paraphrased the
thought would be, "It is not pleasing to me that the wicked die
but that the wicked turn from his way and live." And the same
kind of absoluteness and universality denied in the one case
must be regarded as affirmed in the other.
(3) Confirmation of this interpretation may be derived from
the concluding clauses of verse 11, "'turn ye, turn ye from your
evil ways, and why will ye die, oh house of Israel." The thought
of the last clause is that there is no reason why they should
die. 'There is no reason because of the grace so emphatically
declared in the earlier part of the verse and, by implication,
so fully and freely proffered. There will not be any dispute
regarding the universality of the exhortation and command in the
clause, "turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways." This is a
command that applies to all men without any discrimination or
exception. It expresses therefore the will of God to repentance.
He wills that all should repent. Nothing less than that is
expressed in the universal command. To state the matter more
fully, he wills that all should repent and live or be saved.
When this is related to the last clause, "why will ye die?" it
means that the reason why no one need die, why there is no
reason why any should die, is, that God does not will that any
should die. He wills rather that they repent and live. This
declaration of the will of God to the repentance and life of
all, so clearly implied in the two concluding clauses, rests,
however, upon the declarations of the two preceding clauses, the
clauses with which we are now more particularly concerned. We
should conclude, therefore, that the will to universal
repentance and life, so unmistakably expressed in the concluding
clauses, is also declared or, at least, implied in the words, "I
have no pleasure in the death of the wicked but that the wicked
turn from his way and live." This is just saying that the import
of the hortatory and interrogative clauses at the end require or
presuppose a will of God to repentance and life, a will to which
the bare notion that God is pleased when men repent is not by
any means equal. The only adequate way of expressing the will
implied in the exhortation is the will that all should repent
and it is surely that truth that is declared in the oath
supported statement, "I have no pleasure in the death of the
wicked turn from his way and live.
It is not to be forgotten that when it is said that God
absolutely and universally takes no pleasure in the death of the
wicked, we are not here speaking of God's decretive will. In
terms of his decretive will it must be said that God absolutely
decrees the eternal death of some wicked and, in that sense, is
absolutely pleased so to decree. But in the text it is the will
of God's benevolence (voluntas euarestiss) that is
stated, not the will of God's decree (voluntas eudokiss.)
It is, in our judgment, quite unjustifiable to think that in
this passage there is any reflection upon the decretive will of
God in the word chaphez. And neither is there evidence to
show that in the word chaphez there is here any
comparative notion to the effect that God takes greater pleasure
in saving men than he does in damning them.
It is indeed true that in a few passages in the Old Testament
the word chaphez is used with reference to the decretive
will of God (cI. Ps. 115:3, 135:6, the substantive chephez,
also, in Isa. 44:28; 46:10; 48:14). But in this passage
everything points to the conclusion that the good pleasure or
delight of God spoken of is viewed entirely from the aspect of
benevolent lovingkindness. And it is in terms of that aspect of
the divine will that the words "absolutely" and "universally"
have been used above.
lsaiah 45:22. There can be no question but the
salvation mentioned in this text is salvation in the highest
sense. It cannot be weakened to mean temporary or temporal
security. The salvation must be of the same character as that
referred to in verse 17 and implied in the title appropriated by
God himself in verse 21. The text is also an invitation and
command to all to turn to God and to be saved. The universalism
of this command should be apparent from the expression, "all the
ends of the earth." This is a characteristic Old Testament
phrase to designate all nations and peoples. The
universal scope is, however, confirmed by the context. There are
several intimations of this. In the preceding context the Lord
asserts his
Creatorhood (vss. 12,18). This appeal to his Creatorhood has
the effect of bringing to the forefront a relationship which he
sustains to all men alike. Likewise the Lord protests that he is
the only God, that there is none else besides him (vss.
14,18,21). The emphasis on this becomes more specific in the
repeated assertion that he alone is the Saviour (vss. 15,20,21).
Furthermore, that all men are contemplated is borne out by verse
23, that unto him every knee shall bow, every tongue shall
swear. Finally, this note is implied in the scorn that is poured
out upon the heathen in verse 20"They have not knowledge that
carry the wood of their graven image, and pray unto a god that
cannot save." All these considerations bear directly upon the
universal reference of the appeal in verse 22. It is because God
alone is God and because he alone can save that the exhortation
is extended to all, "turn ye to me and be ye saved." We could
not place any kind of limitation upon the exhortation without
interfering with the universality of the prerogatives claimed by
God himself in the context. It is necessary to stress this
because it might be thought that the universalism of the command
in verse 22 is not distributive universalism but simply ethnical
universalism, all nations without distinction but not all people
without exception. The considerations of the context would show
that there is no exception to the command any more than there is
to the sole Creatorhood sole Godhood and sole Saviourhood of the
God who extends the appeal.
This text expresses then the will of God in the matter of the
call, invitation, appeal, and command of the gospel, namely, the
will that all should turn to him and be saved. What God wills in
this sense he certainly is pleased to will. If it is his
pleasure to will that all repent and be saved, it is surely his
pleasure that all repent and be saved. Obviously, however, it is
not his decretive will that all repent and be saved. While, on
the one hand, he has not decretively willed that all be saved,
yet he declares unequivocally that it is his will and,
impliedly, his pleasure that all turn and be saved. We are again
faced with the mystery and adorable richness of the divine will.
It might seem to us that the one rules out the other. But it is
not so. There is a multiformity to the divine will that is
consonant with the fulness and richness of his divine character,
and it is no wonder that we are constrained to how in humble yet
exultant amazement before his ineffable greatness and
unsearchable judgments. To deny the reality of the divine
pleasure directed to the repentance and salvation of all is to
fail to accept the witness borne by such a text as this to the
manifoldness of fiod's will and the riches of his grace.
II Peter 3:9. In view of what we have found already there is
no reason in the analogy of Scripture why we should not
regard this passage as teaching that God in the exercise of his
benevolent longsuffering and lovingkindness wills that none
should perish but that all should come to repentance. An a
priori assumption that this text cannot teach that God wills
the repentance and salvation of all is a gravely unsound
assumption, for it is not an assumption derived from the analogy
of Scripture. In approaching this text there should be no such
prejudice. What this text does actually teach will have to be
determined, however, by grammatico-historical exegesis of the
text and context.
The choice of the verb "is longsuffering" (makrothumei)
will be considered first. In Luke 18:7, the only other instance
in the New Testament where it refers to the action of God, it
probably relates to the elect. But in that case it is employed
in the somewhat distinctive sense of "delay" in avenging them.
The "longsuffering" (makrothumia) of God, is spoken of
several times, and its usage is illuminating. Romans 9:22
presents a clear instance where it has in view an attitude of
God towards the reprobate; he "endured with much longsuffering
vessels of wrath." In Romans 2:4, it is associated with
the goodness and forbearance of God, and subsumed under his
goodness, as that which is despised by the impenitent who
treasures up for himself wrath in the day of wrath, who does not
know that the goodness of God "leadeth him to repentance" (eis
metanoian se agei). The choice of the verb agein is
to be noted. Since the impenitent are in view, it cannot refer
to efficacious grace. Nevertheless, it is a strong verb as its
use in Romans 8:14 shows: "As many as are led by the Spirit of
God, these are the sons of God" (cf. Gal. 5:18). It must be
understood as a constraining influence flowing from the goodness
of God which is calculated to bring men to repentance. The
construction in Romans 2:4 is remarkably similar to that in II
Peter 3:9.
On the background of these passages, the usage by Peter may
be considered to advantage. In the last days, Peter says,
mockers will mock because the parousia has not come. The
day of judgment will nevertheless come. The apparent delay in
its coming some count slackness. What is counted as slackness by
some should, however, really be recognized as longsuffering (II
Peter 3 :3-9). The longsuffering should not be counted as
slackness, but as salvation (v. 15). The longsuffering is, then,
a positive favor of God towards sinners which is directed to
their salvation.
Up to this point, accordingly, the thought is similar to that
of Romans 2:4. Men may despise God's goodness, forbearance and
longsuffering towards them, not knowing that that goodness has
in view their turning from their sins to God. Men may count the
longsuffering as slackness on God's part, when actually they
ought to account it as designed to extend salvation to them.
But this tentative judgment on the basis of the use of
makrothumia must be related to the rest of verse 9. This
aspect of the question is considerably complicated by the
divergence in the textual tradition at this point. The situation
is reflected in part in the divergence between AV and ARV: "to
us-ward" and "to you-ward." But there is a further complication
due to the fact that there is significant testimony for the
preposition dia, resulting in the possibilities: "on your
account" or "on our account.' The reading dia has come to
be preferred by Mayor, Moffatt, Greijdanus, RSVmg. The
difference between "you" and "us" or "your" and "our" is not
especially significant, since in either case the readers of the
Epistle would be primarily in view. The actual line-up of
authorities does not, however, leave solid external support for
the combination "on our account," though Mayor supports it. The
reading "to us-ward" is clearly the weakest reading, judged by
external evidence; and it is not commended particularly by other
considerations. Hence the choice falls between "to you-ward" and
"on your account." While perhaps it is not possible to decide
finally between these two readings, we may judge that the
reading "on your account" has a very strong claim. The external
evidence for it appears to be at least as strong as for the
other competing reading, and transcriptionally it may be
preferred as being somewhat more unusual and difficult.
The question now arises as to the specific reference of
"you," whether with the preposition dia or eis.
Does the use of this pronoun indicate that reprobate men are out
of consideration here? So it has been argued. However, if the
reprobate are out of consideration here, the "true believers"
would have to be identified with the elect, and the
longsuffering of God would have to be understood as the special,
saving grace of God manifested to the elect alone. We do not
believe that the restriction of the reference to the elect is
well-established. The Epistle does not make this restriction.
Moreover, since on this view, the believers addressed here are
characterized as "living lax Christian lives," are viewed as
requiring repentance, and even as about to "perish" unless they
repent, it cannot be argued plausibly that the apostle would not
have allowed for the presence of some reprobate among the
members of his audience. Even if the "you" is restricted to
professing Christians. one cannot exclude the possibility that
reprobate men were also in view.
The "you" of this passage can hardly be restricted to the
elect. Can it even be restricted to "believers"? Can it be
restricted to believers who urgently stand in need of
repentance? The determination of this question is bound up with
the evaluation of the subordinate clauses. It may be
acknowledged that the decision made with regard to "you" will
bear upon the meaning of the language that follows. But the
reverse is also true. The language of the clauses may be such as
to reflect decisively upon the persons referred to in connection
with the manifestations of longsuffering. Does not, as a matter
of fact, the language "not wishing that any should perish, but
that all should come to repentance" set before us a basic
antithesis between the death or destruction that awaits
impenitent sinners and, by implication, the life eternal
which men may enter upon through repentance? God does not wish
that any men should perish. His wish is rather that all
should enter upon life eternal by coming to repentance. The
language in this part of the verse is so absolute that it is
highly unnatural to envisage Peter as meaning merely that God
does not wish that any believers should perish, but that he
rather wishes that all believers who live laxly should repent of
their sins. If they are believers, they have already come to
repentance, entered upon life, and escaped destruction, even
though the struggle against sin and turning from it must
continue. The language of the clauses, then, most naturally
refers to mankind as a whole as men are faced with the issues of
death or life before the day of judgment comes. It does not view
men either as elect or reprobate, and so allows that both elect
and reprobate make up the totality in view.
The most satisfactory view of II Peter 3:9 is:
1) Peter teaches that the delay of the coming of judgment
should be acknowledged as a manifestation of the longsuffering
or patience of God with sinners.
2) Peter says that God is longsuffering on your account.
It is not because of any slackness in God himself, but
because of the consideration of the well-being of men. The
pronoun "you" cannot be restricted to the elect. It would
certainly include the members of the Christian community as
possible benefactors of the longsuffering of God, but in view of
considerations adduced above may not fairly be restricted to
believers.
3) If the reading "to you-ward" is adopted, the thrust of the
passage is not essentially altered. The delay is not due to
slackness in God, but is to be regarded as an expression of
longsuffering towards men, including very specifically those
addressed in the Epistle.
4) The reason or ground for the longsuffering of God until
the day of judgment is given in what is said concerning his
"willing.'' He is longsuffering in that, or because, he does not
wish that any men should perish, but rather because he wills or
wishes that all should come to repentance. Repentance is the
condition of life, without repentance men must perish. But the
will of God that men be saved expressed here is not conditional.
It is not: I will your salvation if you repent, but: I will that
you repent and thus be saved. The two clauses then go far beyond
defining the longsuffering of God, for they intimate what is
back of his longsuffering. This favour is grounded in God
himself; it is an expression of his will with regard to sinners,
his will being nothing short of their salvation.
The argument that the longsuffering of God that delays
judgment could not concern the reprobate, "for they will never
repent" is to be met exactly as Calvin met similar arguments.
Following his exegesis of II Peter 3:9, Calvin says: "But
it may be asked, If God wishes none to perish, why is it that so
many perish? To this my answer is, that no mention is here made
of the hidden purpose of God, according to which the reprobate
are doomed to their own I ruin, but only of his will as made
known to us in the gospel. For God there stretches out his hand
without a difference to all, but lays hold only of those, to
lead them unto himself, whom he has chosen before the foundation
of the world."
Conclusions
(1) We have found that the grace of God bestowed in his
ordinary providence expresses the love of God, and that this
love of God is the source of the gifts bestowed upon and enjoyed
by the ungodly as well as the godly. We should expect that
herein is disclosed to us a principle that applies to all
manifestations of divine grace, namely, that the grace bestowed
expresses the lovingkindness in the heart of God and that the
gifts bestowed are in their respective variety tokens of a
correspondent richness or manifoldness in the divine
lovingkindness of which they are the expression.
(2) We have found that God himself expresses an ardent desire
for the fulfilment of certain things which he has not decreed in
his inscrutable counsel to come to pass. This means that there
is a will to the realization of what he has not decretively
willed, a pleasure towards that which he has not been pleased to
decree. This is indeed mysterious, and why he has not brought to
pass, in the exercise of his omnipotent power and grace, what is
his ardent pleasure lies hid in the sovereign counsel of his
will. We should not entertain, however, any prejudice against
the notion that God desires or has pleasure in the
accomplishment of what he does not decretively will.
(3) Our Lord himself in the exercise of his messianic
prerogative provides us with an example of the foregoing as it
applies to the matter of salvation. He says expressly that he
willed the bestowal of his saving and protecting grace upon
those whom neither the Father nor he decreed thus to save and
protect.
(4) We found that God reveals himself as not taking pleasure
in or desiring the death of those who die but rather as
taking pleasure in or desiring the repentance and life of the
wicked. This will of God to repentance and salvation is
universalized and reveals to us, therefore, that there is in God
a benevolent lovingkindness towards the repentance and salvation
of even those whom he has not decreed to save. This pleasure,
will, desire is expressed in the universal call to repentance.
(5) We must conclude, therefore, that our provisional
inference on the basis of Matt. 5 :44-48 is borne out by the
other passages. The full and free offer of the gospel is a grace
bestowed upon all. Such grace is necessarily a manifestation of
love or lovingkindness in the heart of God. And this
lovingkindness is revealed to be of a character or kind that is
correspondent with the grace bestowed. The grace offered is
nothing less than salvation in its richness and fullness. The
love or lovingkindness that lies back of that offer is not
anything less; it is the will to that salvation. In other words,
it is Christ in all the glory of his person and in all the
perfection of his finished work whom God offers in the gospel.
The loving and benevolent will that is the source of that offer
and that grounds its veracity and reality is the will to the
possession of Christ and the enjoyment of the salvation that
resides in him.
Endnotes1 Kittel says that 20 manuscripts
read bemoth as in verse 32. If this reading is
correct then, of course, what is said respecting the omission of
the preposition be does not hold.
2 The only instances we have been able to find in
the Old Testament of chaphez be, followed by the
infinitive construct, are Ezekiel 18:23b and 33:11b. chaphez
without the preposition be is fol1owed by the
infinitive construct in other cases cf. Isa. 53:10. |
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